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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION OF POWERS-CONTROL BY
JUDICIARY OF COMPENSATION OF COURT ATrACHEs.-Original pro-
ceedings by the State, on the relation of the judge and chief pro-
bation officer of the Domestic Relations Court of Kanawha County,
for a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the county court to
correct the domestic relations court's annual budget by providing
specified sums as fixed by the judge, under the authority of W. Va.
Acts 1947, c. 172, § 8, as amended, W. Va. Acts 1949, c. 148, W. Va.
Acts 1953, c. 188, for salaries of probation officers and medical,
clerical and secretarial assistants. Held, that the act insofar as it
authorized the judge to fix the amounts of such officers' and
assistants' salaries within minimum and maximum limits is un-
constitutional as vesting a nonjudicial function in the judicial de-
partment of the government. State ex rel. Richardson v. County
Court of Kanawha County, 78 S.E.2d 569 (W. Va. 1953).
The case conforms to a general trend to apply rigidly the
separation of powers clause of the constitution, W. VA. CONST.
Art. V. An examination briefly and in chronological order of the
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principal West Virginia cases relied on for their holdings of uncon
stitutionality of delegations to the judiciary is, however, interest-
ing. Hodges v. Public Service Comm'n, 110 W. Va. 649, 159 S.E.
834 (1931), held unconstitutional an act which authorized a court
to determine on appeal from the Public Service Commission to
whom licenses to construct dams should be issued; but the opinion
recognized that "there is some overlapping of judicial and adminis-
trative duties" and that "such encroachments on other depart-
mental powers are undoubtedly proper when incidental to the
performance of legitimate judicial functions." Id. at 654, 159 S.E.
at 836. State ex rel. Baker v. County Court of Tyler County, 112
W. Va. 406, 164 S.E. 515 (1932), held unconstitutional an act
which gave circuit clerks the right on appeal to determine the
salaries of sheriff's deputies but expressly excluded any implica-
tion that the case might be authority as to an "act respecting the
clerk's allowance" inasmuch as "the circuit judge [is] interested
in the proper functioning of his clerk's office." Id. at 411, 164 S.E.
at 517. County Court of Raleigh County v. Painter, 123 W. Va. 415,
15 S.E.2d 396 (1941), held unconstitutional an act which em-
powered circuit courts on appeal from county courts to fix reason-
able compensation for the circuit clerk's deputies and assistants
because of a declared belief that "the reasoning" of the Baker case
was "sound and decisive." Id. at 419, 15 S.E.2d at 399. While thus
adopting the reasoning of the Baker case, it wholly overlooked the
distinction intimated by the language of the earlier cases. The
express reservation in the Baker case indicates awareness of a
distinction between those who are not members of the court's
family, e.g., personnel of the sheriff's office, and those who con-
stitute the staff of the judicial department under direct super-
vision by the court. The quoted language from the Hodges and
the Baker cases discloses that they did not compel the result in the
Painter case.
The principal case cites eight others as authority for the propo-
sition that the functions of government relating to the fixing of
salaries of probation officers and other relevant positions are pri-
marily nonjudicial. The cited cases each contain a broad dictum
to support the court's position but in a completely different con-
text. Their holdings uniformly are that courts are incompetent
to question the fixing of salaries of nonjudicial public officers and
employees by the legislature or another nonjudicial governmental
authority.
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Whether the constitutional separation of powers is expressed
in a special clause or derived from the framework of the instrument,
the fixing of salaries of public officers in general is not so inherently
legislative that it cannot be delegated. See Arnett v. State, 168
Ind. 180, 80 N.E. 153 (1907). It is doubtful that the West Virginia
court would condemn delegation to an authority deemed appro-
priate; cf. Lepage v. Bailey, 114 W. Va. 25, 170 S.E. 457 (1933),
sustaining an act empowering the governor to limit activities of
any state agency when financial affairs of state government de-
manded. Acts requiring the judiciary to fix the salaries of its
own officers and employees have been held not to vest nonjudicial
function in the judiciary, nor to delegate a legislative function,
under constitutions with separation of powers clauses as precise
as West Virginia's. Mullhalen v. Riley, 211 Cal. 29, 293 Pac. 69
(1930); Winston v. Stone, 102 Ky. 423, 43 S.W. 397 (1897); Rock-
well v. Fillmore, 47 Minn. 219, 49 N.W. 690 (1891). Contra:
Henderson County v. Wallace, 173 Tenn. 184, 116 S.W.2d 1003
(1938). The same result obtains in other states whose constitu-
tions contain no express separation of powers clauses but where
a like division is judicially implied from the framework of the
instruments. State ex rel. Gordon v. Zangerle, 236 Ohio St. 371,
26 N.E.2d 190 (1940); Rosenthal v. McGoldrick, 280 N.Y. 11, 19
N.E.2d 660 (1939); In re Appointment of Revisor, 141 Wis. 592,
124 N.W. 670 (1910). The Zangerle case is particularly interesting
because there existed a provision that "the General Assembly, in
cases not provided for in this constitution, shall fix the term of
office and compensation of all officers. . ." OHIo CONST. Art. II,
§ 20. Despite this, the court sustained an act authorizing the
fixing of salaries of probation officers by the judiciary by resort to
the familiar distinction between state "officers" and "employees"
and by assigning "probation officers" to the latter category.
The cases have generally arisen under statutes providing both
for the court to appoint its own officers and employees and to fix
their salaries, with the challenge directed at the appointment power
and salary control being treated as incidental to that primary con-
sideration. That a court may properly be given power to provide
for the doing of administrative acts necessary and proper to perform
satisfactorily its purely judicial duties, and specifically under legis-
lative authorization to appoint a necessary and proper judicial
staff for those purposes, is well settled and sustained by cases from
states whose constitutions have express separation of powers clauses.
Fox v. McDonald, 101 Ala. 51, 13 So. 416 (1893); People v. Lee.
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72 Colo. 598, 213 Pac. 583 (1923); Russell v. Coaley, 69 Ga. 215
(1882) ; Terra Haute v. Evansville, 149 Ill. 174, 46 N.E. 77 (1897);
Ross v. Freeholders, 69 N.J.L. 291, 55 At. 310 (1903); State v.
Manlowe, 33 Tex. 799 (1870-71); State ex rel. Hall v. County Court
of Monongalia County, 82 W. Va. 564, 96 S.E. 966 (1918). In
State ex rel. Hall v. County Court of Monongalia County, supra,
the statute sustained authorized circuit judges to appoint proba-
tion officers and fix their salaries and was challenged as to the
former power. It would seem that the appointment power would
embrace the collateral determination of compensation. The court
in the Hall case, it is submitted soundly, analogized probation
officers to "attorneys at law, masters in chancery, commissioners to
sell and convey real estate, receivers of property in custodia legis
and referees in bankruptcy," in contrast to "sheriffs and other like
officers," characterizing the former as "officers or assistants of the
court, and not state, county or municipal officers within the mean-
ing of Art. IV of the Constitution." Id. at 571-572, 96 S.E. at 969.
Preoccupation with the word "nonjudicial," it is submitted
betrayed the court in the principal case into undue reliance on a
"tyranny of labels." See Davis, Judicial Review of Administrative
Action in West Virginia-a Study in Separation of Powers, 44 W.
VA. L.Q. 270 (1938). While there may be functions unequivocally
"judicial" and others as essentially "nonjudicial," if there is to
remain any "area of interaction," see Hodges v. Public Service
Comm'n, supra at 654, 159 S.E. at 836, in which the judiciary may
operate in such a manner as to be not repugnant to the separation
of powers clause and in such a manner as to lend itself to the
practical considerations of the government, see Chapman v. The
Huntington, W. Va., Housing Authority, 121 W. Va. 319, 336, 3
S.E.2d 502, 510 (1939), it would seem there must remain other
functions neither purely judicial nor exclusively nonjudicial. Fix-
ing the salaries of the court's officers and employees might more
appropriately be placed in this category. The rule that the judi-
ciary may not be charged with administrative functions does not
apply when such functions are reasonably incidental to the ful-
fillment of judicial duties. See Hodges v. Public Service Comm'n,
supra at 654, 159 S.E. at 836. Determination of the compensation
of the court's officers and employees is an administrative function
incidental to performance of judicial duties which may be entrusted
to the court. Rosenthal v. McGoldrick, supra at 14, 19 N.E.2d at
661. Furthermore, from the nature of the positions to be filled
under the act involved in the principal case and the services to be
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rendered, it is apparent that the judge of the Domestic Relations
Court of Kanawha County would be peculiarly well qualified to
determine what would be the just and proper salaries of the pro-
bation officer and the other appointees.
W. R. B., II.
CRIMINAL LAW-PRINCIPAL IN SECOND DEGREE-CONVICTION OF
ATTEMPT.-D was indicted jointly with another for forcible rape.
He was convicted of an attempt to commit rape, although the
evidence showed that he was guilty as a principal in the second
degree, if guilty of any crime. Held, reversing the lower court and
ordering a new trial, that the verdict was contrary to the evidence,
because one of the elements of an attempt, an ineffectual act taken
toward the completion of the crime, was not proved. Two judges
dissented. State v. Franklin, 79 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1953).
The question whether one indicted as a principal may be con-
victed of an attempt when the proof shows only guilt as a principal
in the second degree had never been specifically answered in this
jurisdiction. At common law it was not necessary to distinguish
between principals in the indictment. Adkins v. State, 187 Ga. 519,
1 S.E.2d 420 (1939). Accordingly, it has been the practice in this
jurisdiction not to specify the principal's degree either in the
indictment or the verdict. State v. Wamsley, 109 W. Va. 570, 156
S.E. 75 (1930). As a general principle the defendant may be con-
victed of a lesser included offense when the charge and proof sus-
tain a higher crime. State v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S.E. 230
(1902); State v. Collins, 108 W. Va. 98, 150 S.E. 569 (1929); Moore
v. Lowe, 116 W. Va. 165, 180 S.E. 1 (1935). W. VA. CODE c. 62, art.
3, § 18 (Michie, 1949) specifically authorizes a conviction for al
attempt upon an indictment for a felony. Thus, it would seem
that the instant case is drawing a narrow distinction in holding
that a principal in the second degree may not be convicted of an
attempt. The principal offender may be convicted of the attempt,
see State v. Collins, supra, even though the proof shows the com-
pleted crime, because in legal theory the attempt is included in
the consummated crime.
The holdings of the cases cited above indicate an effort to
bring our law into conformity with other jurisdictions wherein the
distinctions betwen principals and accessories before the fact have
been abolished for all purposes. People v. Ah Gee, 37 Cal. App. I:
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